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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1995, one distinguished commentator saw fit to characterize the
Florida economic loss rule' as "The Monster that Ate Commercial Torts."2
Nearly four years later, on July 1, 1999, it appears that the Florida Supreme
Court finally made an effort to stop the monster's feeding frenzy. This
attempt to subdue the beast came in the form of the Moransais v.
Heathman3 opinion, authored by Justice Anstead.4 Unfortunately, the
court's effort to 'leash' the rule may have provided more questions than
answers.
Moransaisraises important questions for lawyers and judges in Florida.
Will the Florida Supreme Court now apply the economic loss rule more
narrowly than it has in the past? What are the new limits on the rule and
how are they defined? What is the rule's future with regards to negligence
claims based on non-professional services? While this Casenote admittedly
cannot provide firm answers, it will address those questions and offer some
guidance.
The Moransais case arose from a claim for professional malpractice
against two engineers who performed an inspection of a home purchased
by the plaintiff.5 The plaintiff contracted with the engineers' employer to
perform an inspection of the home prior to purchasing it.6 According to thb
plaintiff, he relied upon the engineers' report in deciding to purchase the
home.7 Subsequent to the purchase, the plaintiff discovered defects which
were not disclosed in the report and which allegedly made the home

1. Generally speaking, the economic loss rule "prohibits tort recovery when a product
damages itself, causing economic loss, but does not cause personal injury or damage to any property
other than itself." Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So.
2d 1244, 1246 (Fla. 1993).
2. Paul J. Schwiep, The EconomicLoss Rule Outbreak:The Monster that Ate Commercial
Torts, 69 FLA. B.J. 34, 34 (Nov. 1995).
3. 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).
4. See id. at 974.
5. See Moransais v. Heathman, 702 So. 2d 601,602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
6. See id.
7. See id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss4/3

2

Walker: Moransais
v. ECONOMIC
Heathman
and
the Florida Economic Loss Rule: Attempt
FLORIDA
LOSS
RULE

uninhabitable.8 Therefore, the plaintiff brought suit against the seller of the
home, the engineering corporation that was hired to perform the inspection,
and the two employees of the engineering corporation who actually
inspected the home.9 The trial court dismissed the claim against the
individual engineers and the Second District Court of Appeal affrmned.10
However, the Second District Court of Appeal certified the following
question to the Florida Supreme Court:
When the alleged damages are purely economic, can the
purchaser of a residence, who contracts with an engineering
corporation for a pre-purchase inspection, maintain a
professional negligence action against the licensed engineer
who performed the inspection as an employee of the
engineering corporation?"
After rephrasing the certified question into two issues,' 2 the supreme
court responded that not only did a cause of action for professional
malpractice against the employee exist, but also, the claim was not barred
by the economic loss rule.' 3 Thus, the court created the need for Florida
lawyers, judges and commentators to revisit the topics of professional
malpractice and the economic loss rule.
While a short mention of the professional negligence issue will be
made, this Casenote seeks primarily to address the impact of Moransaison
the economic loss rule in Florida. In so doing, Part II provides a general
description of the economic loss rule and the reasoning behind the rule.
Part III explores the history of the economic loss rule in Florida. Part IV
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id. at 603.
I1. Id. at 602.
12. The supreme court divided the certified question into the following two issues:
(1)

WHERE A PURCHASER OF A HOME CONTRACTS WITH AN
ENGINEERING CORPORATION, DOES THE PURCHASER HAVE
A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE
AGAINSTAN EMPLOYEE OFTHE ENGINEERING CORPORATION
WHO PERFORMED THE ENGINEERING SERVICES?

(2)

DOES THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE BAR A CLAIM FOR
PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL
ENGINEER WHO PERFORMED THE INSPECTION OF THE
RESIDENCE WHERE NO PERSONAL INJURY OR PROPERTY
DAMAGE RESULTED?

Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 1999).
13. See id.
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discusses the decisions of the Second District Court of Appeal and the
Florida Supreme Court in the Moransais case, provides an in-depth
analysis of the supreme court's decision, and considers possible effects of
Moransaison future interpretations of the Florida economic loss rule. Part
V examines ComptechInternational,Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park,Ltd.,14
a recent Florida Supreme Court decision which discussed Moransaisand
ultimately held that the economic loss rule does not apply to statutory
causes of action. 15 Part VI concludes by setting forth the direct principles
established in Moransais and Comptech, while also offering the
suggestion, evident in both decisions, that another change may soon be
made in the application of the economic loss rule.
II. GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE RULE

A. Descriptionof the Rule
The economic loss rule is a court-developed doctrine 16 that has been
adopted by the majority of U.S. jurisdictions. 7 In its traditional form, the
rule "prohibits tort recovery when a product damages itself, causing
economic loss, but does not cause personal injury or damage to any
property other than itself."' 18 For example, consider a situation wherein a
complex machine, such as a turbine or generator, has a defective
component part and the defect only results in damage to the machine,
without any personal injury or damage to other property. 9 According to the
economic loss rule, the purchaser of the machine cannot recover in tort
from the manufacturer for the damage to the machine.20
'Economic loss' has been defined, in the context of a products liability
suit, to include the cost to repair or replace the defective product, as well
as damages for inadequate value and resulting loss of profits or use. 21
Economic losses have been further described as "'disappointed economic
expectations,' which are protected by contract law, rather than tort law." 22

14. 753 So. 2d 1219 (Fla. 1999).
15. See id. at 1224-26.
16. See Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp., 642 So. 2d 5,7 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
17. See Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244, 1246 n.2; AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987).
18. Casa Clara,620 So. 2d at 1246. Although this simple definition does not indicate the
subtleties of or the confusion surrounding the economic loss rule, it serves well as a starting point

for the discussion.
19. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 867 (1986);
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 900-01 (Fla. 1987).
20. See East River, 476 U.S. at 871; FloridaPower & Light, 510 So. 2d at 902.
21. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 513 (6th ed. 1990).
22. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246 (quoting Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale
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B. Reasons Behind the Rule
As the above description suggests, the economic loss rule represents the
line between the law of contracts, which secures the expectations of the
parties, and the law of torts, which is governed by the duty owed to the
injured party.' Courts have determined that a consumer should not be
burdened with the risk of physical injury or damage to property when he
purchases a product. 24 Thus, tort law, specifically products liability law,
imposes a duty on manufacturers to exercise reasonable care to prevent
their products from injuring persons or property.'
On the other hand, a consumer may be appropriately burdened with the
risk that the product will not meet his economic expectations, unless the
manufacturer warrants that it will. 26 Therefore, "tort law does not impose
any duty to manufacture only such products as will meet the economic
expectations of purchasers."2 7 Instead, when a product falls to meet the
consumer's expectations by damaging itself, the consumer is protected by
contractual remedies, such as a warranty claim.28 The economic losses
suffered when a product damages itself are synonymous with a consumer's
failure to receive the benefit of his bargain, which is "traditionally the core
concern of contract law., 29 By barring tort claims when a product injures
only itself, the economic loss rule "encourages parties to negotiate
economic risks through warranty provisions and price."3°
If tort law did replace negotiation and agreement with a duty to meet
consumers' expectations, manufacturers would likely cover the resulting
risks by raising prices on every contract.3 Therefore, when dealing with
purely economic losses or lost consumer expectations, one issue raised is
"whether the consuming public as a whole should bear the cost of

Architects, Inc., 374 S.E.2d 55,58 (Va. 1988)); Stuartv. Coldwell Banker Commercial Group, Inc.,
745 P.2d 1284, 1291-92 (Wash. 1987).
23. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246; Sidney R. Barret, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss
in Tortfor ConstructionDefects: A CriticalAnalysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891, 894 (1989).
24. See East River, 476 U.S. at 866-67; Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal.
1965); FloridaPower & Light, 510 So. 2d at 900-01.
25. See Monsanto Agric. Prods. v. Edenfield, 426 So. 2d 574, 576 (Fla. Ist DCA 1982).

Products liability developed from a public policy decision that consumers require more shelter from
dangerous products than what is provided by warranty law. See EastRiver, 476 U.S. at 866; Seely,
403 P.2d at 149.
26. See Seely, 403 P. 2d at 151.
27. Monsanto,426 So. 2d at 576.
28. See East River, 476 U.S. at 872. When a product harms itself, the resulting injury is the
product's failure to work properly, which "is the essence of a warranty action." Id. at 867-68.
29. Id. at 870.
30. FloridaPower & Light, 510 So. 2d at 901.
31. See id.
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economic losses sustained by those who failed to bargain for adequate
contract remedies. 32 In the past, the Florida Supreme Court has refused to
impose such a burden on the general public, in the context of both
products33 and services. 3 However, the MoransaisandComptech decisions
indicate a change in the court's thinking.
IMI. HISTORY
When the Florida Supreme Court first adopted the economic loss rule,
it relied, in part, on East River Steamship Corp. v. TransamericaDelaval,
Inc.,36 a U.S. Supreme Court opinion. 37 Therefore, this section initially
discusses the 'roots' provided by that opinion. The growth of the rule in
Florida is then outlined with three leading cases: FloridaPower & Light
Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,38 AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,39 and Casa Clara CondominiumAss'n, Inc.
v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.4" Finally, this section explores the
application of the rule in various contexts.
A. United States Supreme CourtRoots
East River was an admiralty case that reached the Supreme Court on
appeal from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. 4 1 The case presented two
issues before the Court. First, the Court had to determine if admiralty law
embraced the theories of products liability, including strict liability.42

32. Sydney R. Barret, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tortfor Construction Defects: A

CriticalAnalysis, 40 S.C. L. REV. 891,933 (1989).
33. See FloridaPower & Light, 510 So. 2d at 902.

34. See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987).
35. See Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 985 (Fla. 1999) (Overton, J., dissenting).
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Overton suggested that the majority's holding "spread[s] the cost
of the losses among the public as a whole instead of requiring contracting parties to protect
themselves in their contracts." Id.
36. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
37. See FloridaPower & Light, 510 So. 2d at 901.

38. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
39. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
40. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
41. See EastRiver, 476 U.S. at 862. The Third Circuit held that a tort action for damage to
a faulty product exists when the defect poses an unreasonable danger of injury to persons or
property, other than the product itself, and the injury occurs. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval
Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903,908 (3d Cir. 1985). On the other hand, dissatisfaction with the quality
of a product is safeguarded by warranty law. See id. at 909-910. The Third Circuit determined that
the products had only damaged themselves, resulting in the plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with product
quality. See id. at 909. Therefore, the circuit court held that the negligence and strict liability claims
were not actionable. See id. at 910.
42. See EastRiver, 476 U.S. at 859.
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Assuming it responded to the first issue in the affirmative, the Court then
had to decide if damage to a product itself, in a commercial setting, is the
type of injury that should be safeguarded by products liability or simply left
to the remedies of contract law.43 In a unanimous opinion, the Court held:
(1) that general maritime law incorporated the concepts of products
liability, including strict liability,' and (2) that neither negligence nor strict
products liability principles imposed a duty on a manufacturer in a
commercial contract to keep a product from harming itself.'
The petitioners in East River each chartered an oil-transporting
supertanker from Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp.46 The charters provided that
petitioners took complete control of the supertankers and agreed to pay for
any repairs to the ships.47 Each of the tankers was fitted with a turbine
designed, built, and installed by the respondent, Transamerica Delaval, Inc.
("Delaval").48 While being operated under the charter agreement, the
turbines in each of the supertankers had to be repaired, one due to improper
installation and the others due to a defective part.49
The petitioners brought suit against Delaval in United States district
court,50 asserting tortious conduct, breach of warranty, and breach of
contract. 5 After Delaval raised a statute of limitations defense, petitioners
amended the complaint to include only the tort claims."2 The district court
dismissed the nonrenewed claims with prejudice and granted Delaval's
motion for summary judgment on the tort claims." The Third Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed.54
On certiorari,55 the U.S. Supreme Court initially dealt with the question
of whether products liability concepts should be incorporated into

43. See id.
44. See id. at 865-66.
45. See id. at 871.
46. See id. at 859-60.
47. See id. at 860.
48. See id.
49. See id. In one of the ships, the astern guardian valve had been installed backwards. See
id. at 861. The mistake resulted in damage to the low pressure turbine. See id. In the remaining
three ships, the first-stage steam reversing ring nearly disintegrated, which also damaged other
portions of the turbine. See id. at 860.
50. Suit was brought in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
pursuant to admiralty jurisdiction. See id. at 861.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id. at 861-62. Delaval argued that the petitioners' claims were not capable of being

tried under tort theories. See id.
54. See East River S.S. Corp. v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 752 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1985). For
the circuit court's reasoning see supra note 41.
55. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to reconcile conflicting opinions from
the courts of appeals sitting in admiralty. See EastRiver, 476 U.S. at 863.
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admiralty.56 The Court recognized that the theories of products liability,
including strict liability, were widely accepted by the courts of appeals
sitting in admiralty.57 The Court followed the lead of the courts of appeals
and held that general maritime law embraced the concepts of products
liability, including strict liability.5
Having made this "threshold determination," the Court next sought to
tackle the more difficult issue-whether public policy required a
manufacturer, aside from any contractual obligation, to protect against a
commercial product injuring itself 59 The Court noted that "in the
traditional 'property damage' cases," the faulty product injures "other
property."' However, in this case, the defective components within the
turbines only caused damage to the turbines themselves. 6 ' Since the
turbines were sold as single units, the Court decided that the defective
products did not damage other property. 2 According to the Court, "[a
contrary] holding would require a finding of 'property damage' in virtually
every case where a product damages itself, [which] would eliminate the
distinction between warranty and strict products liability."63
Next, the Court analyzed the differences between the majority,
minority, and intermediate approaches to the question of whether tort law
provides an action where a product injures only itself.64 On one end of the
argument, Seely v. White Motor Co.' was credited with the birth of the
majority approach, which prohibits a tort claim if a faulty product caused
purely economic harm.6 6 On the other end, Santor v. A & MKaragheusian,
Inc. 67 was cited for the creation of the minority approach, which imposes
a duty on a manufacturer to protect against injury to the product itself,
regardless of whether the faulty product caused an unreasonable risk of
injury.68 In between the two extremes, the Court noted that several other

56. See id. at 864-66.
57. See id. at 865.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 866.
60. Id. at 867.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. Id. (quoting Northern Power& Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324,330
(Alaska 1981)).
64. See id. at 868-71.
65. 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
66. See East River, 476 U.S. at 868.
67. 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
68. See EastRiver,476 U.S. at 868-69. Accordingto the Supreme Court, the courts following
the minority approach held that the safety and insurance concerns of strict liability were equally
applicable to cases involving purely economic loss. See id. at 869. Furthermore, those courts
considered it arbitrary to allow recovery of economic losses where a defective product causes bodily
injury or other property damage, but not where a defective product damages only itself. See id.
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cases allow a tort claim,69under certain circumstances, when the only injury
is to the product itself.
The Court rejected both the intermediate and minority approaches.70
The intermediate position was discarded, in part, because its ambiguity
made it difficult for manufacturers to plan their business conduct. 7' The
minority view did not pass muster with the Court because it failed to
address "the need to keep products liability and contract law in separate
spheres and to maintain a realistic limitation on damages., 72 Therefore, the
Court adopted a position much like the one articulated in Seely, and held
that neither negligence nor strict products liability theory imposes a duty
on a manufacturer, in a commercial setting, to prevent a product from
damaging itself.73
In support of its position, the Court reasoned that the safety concerns
of tort law are lessened when the product injures only itself.7 4 Injury to the
product itself simply implies that the product has failed to meet the
customer's expectations. 75 The Court posited that an injury of this type is
best remedied under contract or warranty law theories. 76 Warranty law
enables the manufacturer to limit its liability, while77still protecting the
customer's right to receive the benefit of his bargain.
B. Growth in the FloridaSupreme Court
The economic loss rule's growth in the Florida Supreme Court can be
charted by considering three leading cases. First, in FloridaPower& Light
Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,78 the court held that contract law was
more appropriate than tort law for remedying economic loss that is not
accompanied by physical injury or damage to other property.79 Next, in

69. See id. at 869-70. The Court stated that cases adopting the intermediate approach "attempt
to differentiate between 'the disappointed users... and the endangered ones,' and permit only the
latter to sue in tort." Id. (quoting Russell v. Ford Motor Co., 575 P.2d 1383, 1387 (1978)). The
differentiation was supposedly based "on the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner

in which the injury arose." Id. at 870.
70. See id.
71. See id. The Court was also troubled by the fact that the intermediate position made its
determination based on the manner in which the product was damaged. See id.
72. Id. at 870-71.
73. See id. at 871. However, the Court did not close out the possibility that a different tort
cause of action, seeking purely economic damages, could somehow be pursued in general maritime
law. See id. at 871 n.6.
74. See id. at 871.
75. See id. at 872.
76. See id.
77. See id. at 873.
78. 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987).
79. See id. at 902.
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AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.,80 the court
concluded that Florida law did not allow "a purchaser of services to
recover economic losses in tort without a claim for personal injury or
property damage."'" Finally, in Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v.
Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 2 the court determined that the economic
loss rule barred the negligence claims of homeowners who sought to
recoup purely economic losses from a concrete supplier.8 3
1. The FloridaPower & Light Decision
The Florida Supreme Court's first notable decision regarding the
economic loss doctrine came in FloridaPower & Light. The case arose
after Florida Power& Light contracted with Westinghouse to purchase two
nuclear steam supply systems, which included six steam generators.84
Florida Power & Light allegedly found leaks in the six generators;
therefore, the company brought suit claiming that Westinghouse had
breached express warranties in the contract and was negligent.85
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida
awarded Westinghouse partial summary judgment on the negligence claim
"on the grounds that Florida law precludes the recovery of economic loss
without any claim of personal injury or property damage to other
property."86 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals took a
"pass" on the issue and certified two questions to the Florida Supreme
Court:87

(1)

Whether Florida law permits a buyer under contract for
goods to recover economic losses in tort without a
claim for personal injury or property damage to
property other than the allegedly defective goods?

(2)

If Florida law precludes recovery for economic loss in
tort without a claim for personal injury or property

80. 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
81. Id. at 180 (emphasis added).
82. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).

83. See id. at 1245.
84. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 785 F.2d 952, 953 (11th
Cir. 1986).

85. See id.
86. Id.
87. The Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction over questions certified by a United States
Court of Appeals is established by article V, section 3(b)(6) of the Florida Constitution, which
provides that the court "[m]ay review a question of law certified by... a United States Court of
Appeals which is determinative of the cause and for which there is no controlling precedent of the
supreme court of Florida." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(6).
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damage to other property, whether this rule should be
applied retroactively in this case? 88
Relying primarily on EastRiver and Seely, the supreme court, in an
opinion authored by Justice Overton, responded in the negative to the first
question.89 Quoting the reasoning expressed in Seely, 9° the court agreed
with Westinghouse that the predominant view in the United States prevents
recovery of economic damages based on a tort claim when there is no
property damage or personal injury. 91 In addition, the opinion cited East
River for the proposition that in a commercial setting, a manufacturer has
no duty under either strict products liability or negligence law "to prevent
a product from injuring itself.1v0 Noting that a "duty of care . ..is
particularly unsuited to the vagaries of individual purchasers' product
expectations," the court stated that parties to a contract should negotiate
purely economic risks and that such risks should be controlled by warranty
law. 93 As further support for this position, Justice Overton pointed out that
Florida's district courts of appeal had applied similar reasoning in their
holdings.94
After concluding that contract principles were better suited than tort
principles for remedying purely economic loss, the next task was to

88. FloridaPower & Light, 785 F.2d at 953.
89. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 899-900
(Fla. 1987).
90. In Seely, Justice Traynor stated that:
A consumer should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with bearing the
risk of physical injury when he buys a product on the market. He can, however,
be fairly charged with the risk that the product will not match his economic
expectations unless the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in actions for
negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages for physical injuries
and there is no recovery for economic loss alone.
Seely, 403 P.2d at 151.
91. See FloridaPower & Light, 510 So. 2d at 900.
92. Id. at 901 (quoting East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858,
871 (1986)).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 901-02. The majority cited Monsanto AgriculturalProd.v. Edenfield,426 So.
2d 574, 576 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (holding that a duty to manufacture only products that meet the
economic expectations of consumers does not exist in tort law, but does exist under contract law
when the manufacturer agrees to it in his bargain with the consumer); GAF Corp. v. Zack, 445 So.
2d 350, 351 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (holding that tort law did not provide a cause of action for the
plaintiff to recover purely economic losses in a defective products case); and Cedarsof Lebanon
Hosp. v. EuropeanX-Ray Distrib., 444 So. 2d 1068, 1071 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984) (holding that strict
liability should apply only to cases involving personal injury or damage to other property). See id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

11

Florida
FLORIDALaw
LAW Review,
REVIEW Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 3 [Vol.

52

determine whether the principle should be applied retroactively.95 The
court suggested that the economic loss doctrine was not a new rule of law
96
in Florida; instead, it had "along, historic basis" in Floridajurisprudence.
The rule was said to be rooted in "the privity doctrine, which precluded
recovery of economic losses outside a contractual setting." 97 Therefore, the
question was not one of retroactivity; rather, it was simply a matter of
applying existing law to the instant case.98
2. The AFM Corp. Decision
Just three months after deciding FloridaPower & Light, the Florida
Supreme Court rendered its second key decision in the development of the
economic loss rule, AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co. 99 The dispute began after AFM Corporation"° ("AFM") contracted
with Southern Bell to have AFM advertisements published in the yellow
pages. I°' Prior to the distribution of the yellow pages, AFM changed its
location."° Because the move also led to a change in AFM's telephone
number, the parties agreed to hire a referral service to handle customers
who dialed the old number.I13 A problem developed when the yellow pages
were distributed with AFM's old number.1°4 To make matters worse,
Southern Bell unwittingly issued AFM's old number to another customer,
which prevented connection with the referral system.' 05 The connection to
the referral service was eventually restored, but was later inadvertently
disconnected again. 6
AFM brought suit based on a tort claim seeking purely economic
losses. 7 AFM specified that its tort claim was not founded on any
agreement with Southern Bell. 0 8 When the dispute reached the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals, the circuit court certified three questions" to the

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

See FloridaPower & Light, 510 So. 2d at 902.
Id.
Id.
See id.
515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
AFM Corporation specialized in selling and servicing copying machines. See id. at 180.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 180-81.
See id. at 181.
See id.
The three questions certified by the Eleventh Circuit were:
(1)

Can a plaintiff suing exclusively in tort recover lost profits? If the answer
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Florida Supreme Court."' The ensuing supreme court decision
consolidated the three questions into one: "Does Florida permit a purchaser
of services to recover economic losses in tort without a claim for personal
injury or property damage?" ' Expanding its holding in FloridaPower &
Light to now
include services, the court answered the question in the
2
negative."
At the outset of its analysis, the court cited FloridaPower & Light and
noted the obvious distinction from the case under consideration."' While
FloridaPower & Light involved the purchase of goods, AFM's claim
arose from a purchase of services." 4 The court proceeded to point out that
the contract between AFM and Southern Bell "defined the limitation of
liability through bargaining, risk acceptance, and compensation."' " By the
court's interpretation, AFM sought economic damages, based on a tort
claim, for the negligent breach of the contract with Southern Bell." 6
The court cited Lewis v. Guthartz"7 for the principle that in order to
recover under a theory of negligence, there must be a tort claim distinct or
separate from the breach of contract." 8 AFM failed to provide evidence of
a tort independent from the breach of contract, therefore there were no
grounds for recovery in negligence." 9 More specifically, the court held

(2)
(3)

to question 1 is yes,
Can negligent or willful breach of contract alone constitute an
independent tort? If the answer to question 2 is yes,
Can such a tort be the basis of an award of punitive damages if the other
criteria for awarding punitive damages are met?

Id. at 180.
110.
111.
112.
113.

See id.
Id.
See id.
See id.

114. See id.
115. Id. at 181.
116. See id.
117. 428 So. 2d 222 (Fla. 1982). In Lewis the Court answered the following certified question
in the affirmative: "Where the defendant flagrantly, unjustifiably, and oppressively breaches a
contract, and attempts to conceal the breach by the criminal act of making false statements to the
government, must the plaintiffs plead and prove that the defendant committed an independent tort
against them in order to recover punitive damages?" Id. at 223.
118. SeeAFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181.

119. See id. In further support of its conclusion, the court cited district court of appeal
decisions with similar holdings: Electronic Sec. Sys. Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 482
So. 2d 518 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Sprayberry v. SheffieldAuto & Truck Ser., Inc., 422 So. 2d 1073
(Fla. 1st DCA 1982); and Greater Coral Springs Realty, Inc. v. Century 21 Real Estate, Inc., 412
So. 2d 940 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). See id.
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"that without some conduct resulting in personal injury or property
damage, there can be no independent tort flowing from a contractual
breach which would justify a tort claim solely for economic losses."'"
In reaching its decision in AFM Corp., the court noted an apparent
inconsistency with its holding in A.R. Moyer v. Graham,' decided
fourteen years earlier." In Moyer, the court permitted recovery of purely
economic losses based on a negligence theory, even though there was no
personal injury or property damage. 123 However, the court distinguished the
circumstances in Moyer from those in AFM Corp. (and the cases relied on
in deciding AFM Corp.), because, in Moyer, the court had expressly
decided that the plaintiff was not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of,
the contract with the defendant." Since the plaintiff in Moyer, unlike the
which to recover, the
plaintiff in AFM Corp., did not have a contract under
25
Moyer court allowed a cause of action in tort.
3. The Casa Clara Decision
Nearly six years after expanding the rule to cover services in AFM
Corp., the Florida Supreme Court decided Casa Clara Condominium
Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc. 126 In Casa Clara, the court
addressed a conflict 27 between the Third and Fourth District Courts of
Appeal. 28 The issue concerned whether a homeowner was entitled to
recover purely economic losses from a concrete supplier based on a

120. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181-82.
121. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
122. See AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181.
123. See id.
124. See id.
The Court would later limit the decision in Moyer"strictly to its facts." Casa Clara
125. See id.
Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. CharleyToppino & Sons,Inc., 620 So.2d 1244, 1248 n.9 (Fla. 1993).
126. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
127. The Florida Supreme Court'sjurisdiction over conflicts between district courts of appeal
is established in article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, which provides that the court
"[m]ay review any decision of a district court ofappeal... that expressly and directly conflicts with
a decision of another district court of appeal... on the same question of law." FLA. CONST. art. V,
§ 3(b)(3).
128. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1244. The Third District Court of Appeal held that a
homeowner could not recover purely economic losses from a concrete supplier based on a
negligence theory. See Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n,Inc. v.CharleyToppino & Sons, Inc., 588
So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Chapin v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 588 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1991). This decision conflicted with earlier decisions of the Fourth District Court of Appeal.
See Latite Roofing Co. v. Urbanek, 528 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Drexel Properties, Inc.
v. Bay Colony Club Condominium, Inc., 406 So. 2d 515 (4th DCA 1981), review denied,417 So.
2d 328 (Fla. 1982); Adobe Bldg. Ctr., Inc. v. Reynolds, 403 So. 2d 1033 (4th DCA), review
dismissed, 411 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1981).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss4/3

14

Walker: Moransais
v. Heathman
andRULE
the Florida Economic Loss Rule: Attempt
FLORIDA
ECONOMIC LOSS

negligence claim. 9 The court held that the homeowner could not recover
under a negligence theory, thereby affirming the decisions of the Third
District Court of Appeal and disapproving those of the Fourth. 30
The petitioners in Casa Clara owned condominium units and small
homes built with concrete supplied by Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.131 The
concrete was defective 32 and had allegedly damaged the petitioners'
homes.133 The homeowners brought suit against Toppino & Sons claiming
of the building code,"3 and breach
negligence, products liability, violation
35
warranty.
implied
of common law
Seeking to recover purely economic losses, 36 the petitioners urged the
37
court to exclude homeowners from the reach of the economic loss rule. 1
They argued that it would be unfair for the court to limit homeowners to
contract remedies.'38 The court flatly declined to create an exception to the
economic loss rule for homeowners.' 39
Following the reasoning of its earlier decisions, the court determined
that contract law, rather than tort law, was best suited to remedy the
petitioners' loss."4 The court explained that the damage caused to the
home was an "economic disappointment" because the home had failed to
meet the homeowners' expectations. 4 ' Protection for homeowners is
provided by statutory warranties, 4 2 the ability of homebuyers to inspect for
defects, and the purchaser's capacity to barter over price. 43 According to
the court, those "protections must be viewed as sufficient when compared
with the mischief that could be caused by allowing tort recovery for purely
economic losses."' 4

129. See Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1245.
130. See id.
131. See id. By the time the case reached the Florida Supreme Court, Charley Toppino & Sons,
Inc. had dissolved. See id.
132. There were large quantities of salt in some of the concrete supplied by respondent, which
led the reinforcing steel in the concrete to rust. See id.
133. Seeid.
134. Separate from the issue of the tort claims, the court affirmed the district court's decision
that the petitioners could not recover under the building code. See id. at 1248.
135. See id. at 1245.
136. There were no physical injuries and the only property damage was to the homes
themselves. See id. at 1246.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See id. at 1247.
141. Id.
142. The court pointed out that the general warranty of habitability and duty of sellers to
disclose defects exist to protect homeowners. See id.
143. See id.
144. Id.
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The court further rejected the petitioners' suggestion that the defective
concrete caused property damage other than to the product itself. 45 The
homeowners contended that the products they purchased were the separate
items of building material, rather than the homes themselves. 146 The court
disagreed, stating that the homeowners bargained for and purchased the
completed homes, not the separate materials used to build those homes. 47
Therefore, the concrete supplied by respondent was an essential part of the
48
finished product and did not harm property other than the product itself.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Shaw argued that the logic of the
4
economic loss rule did not apply to the circumstances in Casa Clara.1
Justice Shaw explained that the reasoning behind the rule "is that parties
who have bargained for the distribution of loss should not be permitted to
circumvent their bargain after loss occurs to the property that was the
subject of their bargain."'' 50 For Justice Shaw, the key factor was that the
homeowners were not parties to the contract between Toppino and the
general contractor.15 1 Instead, the homeowners were a third party whose
loss was a foreseeable result of the defective concrete.' 52 According to
Justice Shaw, the economic loss rule should not be "stretched" to bar a
action by an innocent third party who suffered a foreseeable
cause of
53
injury.
C. Application of the Rule in Various Contexts
The Florida Supreme Court has considered the application of the
economic loss rule in a number of different contexts. For instance, the
court has recognized a "no alternative theory of recovery" exception to the
rule. 54
' In addition, the court has declined to extend the rule to fraud in the
inducement claims. 55 However, the court has applied the rule in a case

145. Seeid.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id. If the court had determined that the concrete was a separate product from the
remainder of the home, then the defective concrete would have damaged "other" property. Under
those circumstances, the economic loss rule would probably not bar the homeowners' tort claims.
149. See id. at 1248 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
151. See id. at 1249 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
152. See id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
153. See id. (Shaw, J., dissenting).
154. Airport Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 660 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla.1995).
155. See PK Ventures, Inc. v. Raymond James & Assoc., Inc., 690 So. 2d 1296, 1297 (Fla.
1997); HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 1996);
Woodson v. Martin, 685 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 1996).
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where there may have been a duty to warn. 5 6 This subsection discusses the
court's interpretation of the economic loss rule in these various contexts.
1. "No Alternative Theory of Recovery" Exception
In 1995, the Florida Supreme Court credited two cases, Latite Roofing
Co. v. Urbanek57 and A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham,'58 with establishing a
"no alternative theory of recovery" exception to the economic loss rule. 5 9
However, in an earlier decision, the court had disapproved Latite and
restricted the holding in Moyer to its facts. " As the cases discussed below
indicate, the "no alternative theory of recovery" exception allows, under
limited circumstances, recovery for purely economic losses based on a tort
theory when the plaintiff has no alternative remedy available.
In Moyer, a third-party 61 general contractor sought to recover economic
damages from a supervising architect who was negligent in preparing and
presenting designs, plans, and specifications. 62 The court concluded "that
a third party general contractor, who [was] foreseeably ... injured or
sustained an economic loss proximately caused by the negligent
performance of a contractual duty of an architect, has a cause of action
against the alleged negligent architect, notwithstanding [the] absence of
privity" of contract. 63 Therefore, the court permitted
the general
64
contractors' negligence claim against the architect.'
Essential to the Moyer decision was the fact that the general contractor
was not a party to, or a third party beneficiary of, the contract with the
architect. 65 Also important was the architect's supervisory relationship to
the general contractor. 66 The architect's supervisory role included a "duty

156. See Airport Rent-a-Car,660 So. 2d at 632.
157. 528 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988).
158. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
159. See Airport Rent-a-Car,660 So. 2d at 631.
160. See Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244, 1248 n.9 (Fla. 1993).
161. The general contractor was not a party to the contract between the architect and the
owner; rather, he was merely an incidental beneficiary. See Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 402-03.
162. See id. at 398.
163. Id. at 402. Privity of contract is the relationship that exists between the parties to a
contract. See BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 1199 (6th ed. 1990). Although privitybetween theplaintiff
and defendant was traditionally necessary to maintain an action on a contract, absence of privity
is "generally no longer [a] viable" defense in contract or tort actions seeking damages. Id.
164. See Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 402.
165. See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987)
(discussing the court's decision in Moyer).
166. See Airport Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 660 So. 2d 628, 631 (Fla. 1995).
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not to injure foreseeable parties [who were] not beneficiaries of the
contract."167
Something akin'68 to the "no alternative theory of recovery" exception
has also been applied in one case involving an accountant 69 and another
involving an abstractor.' 70 In FirstFloridaBank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell &
C o.,171 the Florida Supreme Court was confronted with negligence claims
made by a third party against a certified public accountant. 72 The court
adopted the reasoning of section 522 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1976), which establishes conditions for holding accountants liable for
negligent misrepresentation to parties not in contractual privity.173 Based
on the reasoning of section 522, the court determined that where an
accountant is negligent in preparing financial statements that he knows 74

167. AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181.
168. The holdings in the two cases discussed are "akin" to the "no alternative theory of
recovery" exception because both suits were brought by plaintiffs who lacked contractual privity,
both involved negligence in performing a service, the plaintiffs in each case appeared to lack an
alternative remedy, and the court approved the tort cause of action in both cases. These
characteristics are all similar to those of Moyer, where the "no alternative theory of recovery"
exception was applied.
169. See First Fla. Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990).
170. See First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co., 457 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1984).
171. 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990).
172. See id. at 10-11. The third-party plaintiff was First Florida Bank, See id. at 10. The bank
had based a decision to loan money to C.M. Systems on audited financial statements and verbal
assurances provided by the accountant. See id. at 10-11. When the bank discovered significant
inaccuracies in the audit and the accountant's assurances, it brought suit against the accountant and
his firm. See id. at 11.
173. See id. at 14. Section 522 provides in relevant part:
(1)

(2)

One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or in
any other transaction in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false
information for the guidance of others in their business transactions, is
subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable
reliance on the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in Subsection (1) is
limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for whose
benefit and guidance he intends to supply the information or knows
that the recipient intends to supply it; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends to influence
or knows that the recipient so intends or in a substantially similar
transaction.

§ 552 (1976).
174. The court refused to extend liability to individuals whom an accountant "should have
known" would rely on the statements; instead, it limited liability to those whom the accountant
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS
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will be relied upon by a third party who is not in privity, the third party
may pursue a cause of action for negligence. 75
Nearly six years before FirstFloridaBank, the court applied similar
reasoning in First American Title Insurance Co. v. First Title Service
Co."'76 In First American Title, a title insurance company brought suit
against an abstractor for negligent preparation of an abstract."7 The
abstracts were prepared for the owners of two lots, not for the title
insurance company.'78 Therefore, the insurer did not have contractual
privity with the abstractor. 7 9 However, the insurance company argued that
the abstractor knew, at the time of preparation, that a party other than the
one contracting for the abstracts would rely on them. 80 The insurance
company allegedly did rely on the abstracts and, in so doing, sustained
purely economic losses.' 8 '
The court held that when the abstractor "knows, or should know," that
an abstract prepared for a seller will be relied upon by a purchaser, and the
purchaser does rely on the abstract, then the abstractor's duty of care also
runs to the purchaser.' 2 In addition, the abstractor's duty of care will run
to other parties interested in the transaction, such as title insurers,
mortgagees, and tenants, because of their ties with the purchaser.'83
Therefore, the court concluded that the title insurance company could
maintain a cause of action in negligence against the abstractor.'8 4

"knows" will rely. See First FloridaBank, 558 So. 2d at 15.
175. See id. at 16.
176. 457 So. 2d 467 (Fla. 1984).
177. See id. at 468.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id. The insurance company, allegedly relying on the abstracts, had provided title
insurance policies to the purchasers of the two lots and their mortgagee. See id. The abstracts
supposedly failed to reveal a recorded judgment against the seller of the lots, and the holder of the
judgment sought payment from the purchasers after the purchase. See id. As required by the
insurance policies, the insurance company paid the amount of the judgment, approximately
$75,000. See id.
182. Id. at 473. The court refused to extend the abstractor's liability "to any and all persons
who might foreseeably see, use, and rely on the abstract." Id. at 472. In so doing, the court
distinguished Moyer from the facts presented in the case before it. See id. at 471-72, However, the
court based the distinction on its disagreement with plaintiff's assertions that the products liability
concepts discussed in Moyer established a duty of care to anyone who foreseeably relies on the
abstract. See id. at 472. Therefore, this Casenote still submits that the approach applied in First
American Title was similar to the "no alternative theory of recovery" exception established in
Moyer. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
183. See FirstAm. Title, 457 So. 2d at 473.
184. See id.
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2. Fraud in the Inducement Claims
On October 17, 1996, the Florida Supreme Court rendered two
decisions holding that the economic loss rule does not bar actions for fraud
in the inducement: HTP,
Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses,S.A.' 85 and
186
Woodson v. Martin.
In HTP, the court determined that fraud in the inducement is a tort
independent of the contractual breach and is thus not barred by the
economic loss rule.187 The plaintiff in HTP claimed that it was fraudulently
induced into reaching a settlement agreement.18 8 The court recognized that
even when there is a contract, a tort action can be maintained for
intentional or negligent acts that are independent from the contractual
breach. 8 9 The court further reasoned that "[flraudulent inducement is an
independent tort in that it requires proof of facts separate and distinct from
the breach of 6ontract."' 19 Fraud in the inducement typically involves
actions prior to entering the contract and is not related to the events that
lead to the subsequent breach of the contract. 9 ' Therefore, the court held
that the plaintiff's fraud
in the inducement action was not barred by the
192
economic loss rule.
In Woodson, an opinion filed at the same time as HTP, the court applied
the reasoning of HTP to an action brought by a purchaser of residential
property.' 93 The court concluded that the economic loss rule did not
prevent the purchaser's fraud in the inducement action against 1the
94 real
estate agent and its individual agent who represented the sellers.
3. Negligent Failure to Warn Claims
Although the Florida Supreme Court has created an 'exception' to the
economic loss rule for fraudulent inducement actions, it has refused to do
the same with a cause of action based on a negligent failure to warn.' 95 In
Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car,Inc., 96 the court refrained from

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

685 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. 1996).
685 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 1996).
See HTP, 685 So. 2d at 1240.
See id. at 1238-39.
See id. at 1239.
Id.
See id.
See id. at 1240.
See Woodson, 685 So. 2d at 1241.
See id.
See Airport Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 660 So. 2d 628, 632 (Fla. 1995).
660 So. 2d 628 (Fla. 1995).
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establishing an exception to the economic loss rule where the defendant
allegedly had a duty to warn and failed to do so.'9
The plaintiff in Airport Rent-a-Carowned buses manufactured by the
defendant.' 8 Two of the buses were destroyed by fire while being operated,
one while carrying school children.'99 The buses were purchased from a
third party; therefore,the plaintiff and defendant did not have a contractual
relationship."00 The plaintiff alleged that after manufacturing the buses, the
defendant knew or should have known that the buses were unreasonably
dangerous.2 "1 The plaintiff further argued that the defendant failed to warn
of the danger, and that such a failure established an independent tort
exception to the economic loss rule.2"
The court disagreed with the plaintiff's assertions.20 3 It reasoned "that
there can be no independent tort action for purely economic loss without
an accompanying physical injury or other property damage. ' 2 ' Therefore,
the court declined to provide an exception to the economic loss rule for a
negligent failure to warn claim. 0'
4. Limits on the Rule
FirstFloridaBank, FirstAmerican Title, HTP, Woodson, and Moyer
all represent specific limits on the application of the economic loss rule.2"
For instance, even though the opinions in FirstAmerican Title and First
Florida Bank do not specifically discuss the economic loss rule, their
rationale and holdings are "clearly inconsistent" with the rule's
applicability to the facts in each case.2' 7 In addition, Moyer established a
"no alternative theory of recovery" exception to the rule. 2 8 Furthermore,
HTP and Woodson recognized that a tort that is independent from the
contract will not be barred by the economic loss rule.200 On the other hand,

197. See id. at 632.
198. See id. at 629.
199. See id.

200. See id.
201. See id. at 632.
202. See id.
203. See id.

204. Id.
205. See id.
206. See, e.g., Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d at 983-84 (Fla. 1999).
207. See id at 982 (citing First Am. Title, 457 So. 2d at 467 and First Florida Bank v. Max
Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990)).
208. Airport Rent-a-Car, 660 So. 2d at 631.
209. See HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 1996);
Woodson v. Martin, 685 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 1996).
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Airport Rent-a-Car exemplifies an instance where the supreme court
declined to limit the reach of the rule. 10
IV. MORANASAIS

v. HEATHMAN

A. The Facts
In June of 1993, the plaintiff, Phillipe Moransais, agreed to buy a home
from Paul Heathman. 21 ' Before purchasing the home, Moransais hired
Bromwell & Carrier, Inc. ("BCr') to inspect it.212 BCI and Moransais
entered into a contract 1 3 which provided that the inspection would be
"performed on a time and materials basis with a budget of $600. " 214 The
contract also limited BCI's liability to $50,000.215
The inspection was performed, in June, by two licensed2 6 engineers
who were employees of BCI2 7 The report submitted by the engineers
expressed "limited concern" about the foundation of the home but did not
discuss any concerns
about the roof, the air conditioning system, or the
18
system.2
electrical
Moransais alleged that in deciding to buy the home he relied on the
inspection, and that after purchasing the home he uncovered defects that
made the home uninhabitable. 2 9 Based on those allegations, Moransais
brought suit against Heathman for fraud and breach of contract, BCI for
breach of contract, and BCI's two employees for professional
220 In the suit, Moransais sought to recover purely economic
negligence.
221
losses.

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Airport Rent-a-Car,660 So. 2d at 632.
See Moransais v. Heathman, 702 So. 2d 601,602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
See id.
The contract was titled a "Contract for Professional Services." Id.
Id.
See id.
The engineers were licensed pursuant to Chapter 471 of Florida Statutes (1973). See id.
See id.The employees who performed the inspection were Mr. Jordan and Mr. Sauls. See

id.
218. Id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See id. In his complaint, Moransais did not allege that there was any personal injury or
damage to other property. See id.
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B. The DistrictCourt'sDecision
The negligence claims against the two employee engineers were
dismissed by the trial court.2 2 On appeal, the Second District Court of
Appeals affirmed. 223 The district court concluded that the plaintiff's tort
actions against the employees were barred by the economic loss rule.224
The court explained that when an "exception" is created to the
economic loss rule, it "is actually an expansion of negligence to protect
interests not traditionally protected by negligence law." 2" The exception
safeguards a purely economic interest by establishing a new duty and
coinciding standard of care.226 The court stressed that before the judiciary
establishes this new duty in negligence, it should believe that the problem
warrants spreading the pertinent risks across society as a whole and that the
problem cannot be cured by private contracts or statutory law. 227
Applying this reasoning to the facts at hand, the court noted that the
plaintiff was not without a remedy if the negligence action was barred.22
In fact, the plaintiff's breach of contract action against BCI was still
pending at the time.22 9 Therefore, the plaintiff sought to recover economic
losses from the contracting party as well as the employees who performed
under the contract. 230 The court concluded that allowing the tort claims
against the employee engineers would violate "the economic loss rule by
allowing [the plaintiff] to pursue in tort what amounts to a breach of
contract claim and, thereby, expand his remedy for breach of contract
beyond that to which he agreed. 231
Considering "the continuing uncertainty surrounding the economic loss
rule '232 and the likelihood of a conflict with an earlier Fifth District
decision,233 the court certified a question2 4 to the Florida Supreme Court

222. See id. at 603. The trial court dismissed the claims on the grounds that SandaracAss'n
v. W.R. FrizzelArchitects, Inc. required dismissal. See id. In Sandarac,the Second District Court
of Appeal held that a condominium association could not recover in negligence against an architect
or general contractor for purely economic losses. See Sandarac Ass'n v. W.R. Frizzel Architects,
Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349, 1351 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
223. See Moransais,702 So. 2d at 603.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See id.
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 602.
233. See Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp., 642 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).
234. The question certified by the Second District read: "When the alleged damages are purely
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as a matter of "great public importance. '235
C. The FloridaSupreme Court'sDecision
When it set out to review the decision of the Second District Court of
Appeal, the Florida Supreme Court divided the certified question into two
issues:
(1)

Where a purchaser of a home contracts with an
engineering corporation, does the purchaser have a
cause of action for professional malpractice against an
employee of the engineering corporation who
performed the engineering services?

(2)

Does the economic loss rule bar a claim for
professional malpractice against the individual
engineer who performed the inspection of the
residence where no personal injury or property damage
resulted? 6
1. The Majority Opinion

Initially, the court established that professional negligence is a
recognized cause of action in Florida.237 Evidence of that recognition is
found in section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes,238 which provides limits on
actions.2 31 9 The court reasoned that engineering was considered a

economic, can the purchaser of a residence, who contracts with an engineering corporation for a
pre-purchase inspection, maintain a professional negligence action against the licensed engineer
who performed the inspection as an employee of the engineering corporation?"Moransais, 702 So.
2d at 602.
235. Id.
236. Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 1999).
237. See id. at 975-76.
238, Section 95.11 provides in relevant part:
Actions other than for recovery of real property shall be commenced as
follows:
(4) WITHIN TWO YEARS.(a) An action for professional malpractice, otherthan medical malpractice,
whether founded on contract or tort.... However, the limitation of actions herein
for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons in privity with the
professional.
FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (4)(a) (1997).
239. See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 977.
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profession, according to the meaning of "profession" found in section
95.1l.' Therefore, engineers are professionals for the purposes of
professional malpractice.241
Next, disagreeing with the district court's decision on the first
rephrased issue, the court held that the plaintiff homebuyer did have a
cause of action against the defendant employees.4 2 The holding was based
on statutory interpretation and the court's decision in In re The Florida
Bar,243 decided nearly forty years earlier.24
In FloridaBar, the Florida Bar sought approval from the court for
certain amendments 245 that would permit lawyers to incorporate. 46 The
court approved the amendments, thus allowing lawyers to practice as
corporate entities. 247 However, the decision in FloridaBarwas "subject to
the express recognition that under the common law, a lawyer who renders
professional services owes a duty of care regardless of the fact that the
lawyer is an associate or partner in a business entity that contracts to
provide professional services to the injured party." 8 According to the
Moransais court, this decision exhibited that individual professionals in
Florida are held responsible for their negligent acts. 9
As further support for this position, the court cited two statutes, section
621.07 and section 471.023.50 Both sections allow professionals to form
corporate entities or partnerships for the purpose of providing professional
services 5 1 However, both also display "an intent to hold professionals
personally liable for their negligent acts by expressly stating that the
formation of a corporation or partnership shall not relieve the individual
members of their personal professional liability." 2
Applying the analysis to the instant case, the court concluded that the
plaintiff could bring an action for professional negligence
against the
253
individual engineers who performed the inspection. The fact that the

240. See id. The majority stated: "[a] profession, within the meaning of section 95.11, is 'any
vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing is possible in Florida."'
Id. (quoting Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 1992)).

241. See id.
242. See id.
243. 133 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1961).
244. See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 977.
245. The amendments were to the Integration Rule and Code of Ethics. See id.

246. See id.
247. See id. at 977-78.
248. Id.
249. See id.

250. See id. at 978.
251. See id.
252. Id.
253. See id. at 979.
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employee engineers did not sign254 the contract between their employer and
the plaintiff made no difference. 25 Based on section 471.023 and section
621.07, the court asserted that the legislature intended to hold employee
engineers individually liable for professional negligence. 56
Once it was determined that a cause of action for professional
malpractice could be maintained, it remained to be decided if that action
was barred by the economic loss rule. 7 After offering an explanation of
the rule and its origins, 5 the court recognized that its "pronouncements on
the rule have not always been clear." 259 As an example, the court cited its
extension of the rule to bar a negligence claim involving nonprofessional
W Although the court noted approval for the result
services in AFM Corp.26
loss rule in
reached in AFM, it stated that the application of the economic
2 61
that case "may have been unnecessarily over-expansive.
The court went on to suggest that it had "recognized the danger in an
unprincipled extension of the rule., 262 As support for this proposition, the
holdings in HTP, Woodson, and PK Ventures, Inc. v. Raymond James &
Associates2 63 were cited.264 According to the court, these cases exhibited a
recent effort to limit the breadth of the rule.265 Moyer, FirstFloridaBank,
and FirstAmericanTitle were also mentioned as examples of the particular
limitations of the rule.26 6
According to the court, it never meant for the economic loss rule to
prohibit "well-established common law causes of action;" instead, the rule
was mainly intended to restrict actions in the products liability arena.267
The rule should only be applied in circumstances "where the policy
considerations are substantially identical to those underlying the products
liability-type analysis." 268 Furthermore, the court suggested that parties

254. One ofthe engineers, Lennon D. Jordan, actually did "sign" the contract; however, he did
so on behalf of the engineering corporation and not in an individual capacity. See Moransais v.
Heathman, 702 So. 2d 601, 602 (Fla. 1997).
255. See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 979.
256. See id.
257. See id.
258. The court acknowledged that "[t]he exact origin of the economic loss rule is subject to
some debate and its application and parameters are somewhat ill-defined." Id.
259. Id. at 980.
260. See id. at980-81.
261. Id. at981.
262. Id.
263. 690 So. 2d 1296 (Fla. 1997) (applying the reasoning of HTP and holding that a claim of
negligent misrepresentation was not barred by the economic loss rule).
264. See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 981.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 982-83.
267. Id. at 983.
268. Id.
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seeking professional services may not be able to protect themselves in the
same way as parties contracting for the sale of a product. 269 Therefore, the
court held that the "principles underlying the economic loss rule" were not
sufficient to bar the plaintiffs cause of action for professional negligence
against the individual engineers.270
2. Justice Well's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Justice Wells agreed with the majority's
reasoning, but added a clear statement that the economic loss rule should
be restricted to situations where a product damages itself because of a
defect within the product.27 Furthermore, Justice Wells considered the
decision in AFM Corp. an incorrect application of the economic loss rule,
which led to "confusion as to the rule's applicability." 272
3. Justice Overton's Dissent
In a strong dissent, Justice Overton proclaimed that the court's holding
in CasaClarashould have controlled the instant case.273 Seeing no logical
way to reconcile tort recovery in this case with the decision in Casa
Clara,2 4 Justice Overton asserted that the majority had overruled Casa
Clara without admitting it.275 Furthermore, the majority opinion
"substantially obliterated" the line between contract and tort law.276
Justice Overton interpreted the majority opinion to mean that if a client
expressly contracts with a law firm for legal services which are negligently
performed, then the wronged client has causes of action upon the same
facts for a breach of contract, as well as for professional malpractice
individually against every lawyer who was associated with the case.277
According to Justice Overton, the likely result of the majority's approach
will be higher malpractice insurance rates, which will be passed on to
consumers. 278 In other words, the majority's holding distributes the costs

269.
270.
271.
272.

See id.
Id.
concurring).
See id. at 984 (Wells, J.,
Id. (Wells, J., concurring).

273. See id. (Overton, J., dissenting).
274. Justice Overton stated, "[i]n my view, there is absolutely no logical basis to justify a
recovery in tort to the property owners in this case when no tort recovery was allowed to the
property owners against the concrete supplier for defective concrete in Casa Clara." Id. at 985
(Overton, J., dissenting).
dissenting).
275. See id. (Overton, J.,
276. Id. (Overton, J., dissenting).
277. See id. (Overton, J., dissenting).
278. See id. (Overton, J.,
dissenting).
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of the economic losses to society as a whole, rather than forcing
contracting parties to allocate the risks by contract. 279
D. Analysis of the Moransais Decision
Although the court's decision in Moransaisthat a cause of action for
professional malpractice existed is certainly worthy of consideration, the
focus of this Casenote is on the economic loss rule issue. Therefore,
questions raised by the court's response to the first rephrased certified
question, such as the wisdom of treating engineers like lawyers, will be left
to other eager commentators. However, even assuming the correctness of
the court's conclusion that a cause of action existed, questions still arise as
to the court's decision not to bar the cause of action with the economic loss
rule.
Despite the court's apparent effort in Moransais to clear the fog
surrounding the economic loss rule, the majority's decision probably did
just the opposite. It is difficult to reconcile Moransais with the court's
earlier decisions in AFM Corp. and Casa Clara. In addition, the facts in
Moransaisdo not fit within any of the "exceptions" or limits on the rule
previously established by the court. In short, the court failed to achieve the
clarity that may have been gained by taking the approaches suggested in
Justice Well's concurrence or Justice Overton's dissent.
1. Conflict with AFM Corp.
As suggested by Justice Well's concurrence,280 the Moransaisdecision
might have been clearer if it had simply overruled AFM Corp. As
previously mentioned, in AFM Corp.the court extended the economic loss
rule's application to cases involving services.2"' From a purely analytical
perspective, it is difficult to reason why the rule should bar a tort action
based on a service contract in AFM Corp. and not in Moransais.In both
cases, the plaintiffs contracted for a service, agreed to a limitation on
liability in a contract, and sustained purely economic losses.282
Furthermore, AFM Corp. established that in order to recover in
negligence for purely economic losses, a party must establish a tort
independent from the contractual breach.283 In Moransais, the alleged
professional negligence occurred while the engineers were performing the

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

See id. (Overton, J., dissenting).
See id. at 984 (Wells, J., concurring).
See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180, 181 (Fla. 1987).
CompareMoransais,744 So. 2d at 983-84; with AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 180-81.
See AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 181.
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contract.28 4 The facts that led to the cause of action for professional
negligence against the individual engineers were apparently the same facts
that gave rise to the pending breach of contract action against the
engineer's employer.2" 5 Therefore, the claim for professional negligence
does not appear to meet AFM's requirement that the tort be independent
from the breach of contract.
The Moransaiscourt correctly recognized thatAFM Corp."expand[ed]
the application of the rule beyond its principled origins."2 6 The expansion
is evident when the AFM Corp. decision is compared with the U.S.
Supreme Court's initial articulation of the economic loss rule in East
River. In EastRiver, the Supreme Court explained the rule as follows: "a
manufacturer in a commercial relationship has no duty under either a
negligence or strict products liability theory to prevent a product from
injuring itself."28 7 This explanation of the rule indicates that the rule is
designed to apply to products, not services.
Although the Moransaiscourt also cited AFM Corp. as contributing to
the confusion over the rule in the trial and appellate courts, the court
refused to recede from the AFM Corp. holding. Instead, the court simply
stated that it "may have been unnecessarily over-expansive in [its] reliance
on the economic loss rule as opposed to fundamental contractual
principles., 288 This suggestion is confusing since the rule's purpose is to
hold parties to the fundamental principle that contract law should protect
consumer's economic expectations.
It appears that the court tried to subtly distinguish Moransais from
AFM Corp. in order to avoid overruling it. The Moransaisopinion noted
that AFM Corp. involved "nonprofessional services. ' 289 This was an
obvious distinction from the facts of Moransais, which involved
professional services. The court seemed to give meaning to this distinction
by expressing concern that a party seeking professional services may not
be able to obtain the same contractual protection as a party buying a
product. 2" One could infer that the same concern does not apply to a party
seeking nonprofessional services. In addition, the court repeatedly stated
that the economic loss rule was not meant "to bar well-established causes
of action such as those for neglect in providing professional services. 291

284. See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 974-75.
285. See id.
286. Id.at 980.
287. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 (1986).
288. Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 981. The court gave no indication of what "fundamental
contractual principles" it would have relied on. Id.
289. Id. at 980.
290. Seeid.at981.
291. Id. at 983.
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While the apparent distinction between professional and nonprofessional
services allows AFM Corp. to remain "good law," it does not offer much
assistance in judging the rule's application in the future.
In short, the court's failure to overrule AFM Corp. left a gray area
around the application of the economic loss rule to service contracts. There
is uncertainty as to whether only claims for professional negligence will
avoid the rule's grasp, or if negligence claims involving nonprofessional
services will escape as well. This uncertainty might have been avoided by
following Justice Well's suggestion that the "rule... be limited to cases
involving a product which damages itself by reason of a defect in the
product. 292
2. Conflict with Casa Clara
Although Justice Overton's dissent takes a contrary position to Justice
Well's concurrence, the dissent is similar to the concurring opinion in that
it offers a clearer decision than the majority approach. As Justice Overton
suggests, the holding in Moransaisappears logically inconsistent with the
decision in Casa Clara.293 The homeowners in Casa Clara were not
allowed to recover for the damage caused by the defective concrete that
was installed in their home.2 94 Yet, the plaintiff in Moransais was
permitted to bring an action for the negligent inspection of his home. 95
This seems to suggest that a homeowner may bring claims in tort for work
that was done by professionals, but not for work performed by
nonprofessionals, on the same home.
Furthermore, like the homeowners in Casa Clara,the plaintiff in Moyer
suffered purely economic losses. 29 6 According to Casa Clara, these
economic losses were merely "'disappointed economic expectations,'
which are protected by contract law rather than tort law. ' 29 7 In order to
recover in tort, the buyer must suffer more than just disappointed
expectations. 298 In Moransais,the plaintiff bargained for an inspection of
his home.2 99 When he did not receive a quality inspection, the plaintiff's
only loss was arguably a disappointed expectation. In other words, he
failed to receive the benefit of his bargain. The failure to receive the

292. Id. at 984 (Well, J., concurring).
293. See id. 984-85 (Overton, J., dissenting).
294. See Casa Clara Condominium Assoc., Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d
1244, 1247 (Fla. 1993).
295. See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 974.
296. There was no claim of personal injury or property damages in either case.
297. Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246 (quoting Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale
Architects, Inc., 374 S.E. 2d 55, 58 (Va. 1988)).
298. See id.
299. See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 974-75.
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benefit of his bargain was protected by the contract with the engineering
corporation. Without personal injury or property damage, Casa Clara
seems to suggest that the plaintiff in Moransaisshould not recover in tort.
3. A New Limit on the Rule
In addition to conflicting with Casa ClaraandAFM Corp., Moransais
does not appear to fall within any of the exceptions or limits to the
economic loss rule. Although the court refers to the limits or exceptions
previously applied to the economic loss rule,3 ° the facts in Moransaisdo
not support the application of any of those pre-determined limits. For
instance, Moransais does not mesh with the "no alternative theory of
recovery" exception established in Moyer,3"' because the plaintiff in
Moransaisclearly had causes of action for breach of contract against the
seller of the home and the engineering corporation. Furthermore, unlike the
plaintiffs in Moyer, First FloridaBank, and FirstAmerican Title, the
plaintiff in Moransaisdid not lack privity of contract. Rather, he was in
privity with the engineering corporation which he hired to perform the
inspection. 0 2 In fact, it was the defendant employees in Moransais who
lacked contractual privity, which presents a different circumstance from the
cases mentioned above.30 3
Moransaisalso does not conform to the fraud in the inducement cases,
HTP and Woodson. As stated earlier, the tort claim in Moransaisdid not
appear to be independent of the contractual breach, whereas tort claims for
fraud in the inducement have been held to be independent. 0 Unlike
HTP,a°5 the facts giving rise to the tort claim in Moransais were not
distinct from the facts establishing the claim for breach of contract.
Since none of the previously established limits to the rule seem to apply
to Moransais,the case probably represents a new limit or exception to the
economic loss rule. Perhaps the boundaries of this new limit were
ambiguously suggested by the statement that the rule "should ... be
limited to those . . . situations where the policy considerations are
substantially identical to those underlying the product liability-type

300. See id. at 979-83.
301. See Airport Rent-a-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 660 So. 2d 628,631 (Fla. 1995); A.R.
Moyer, Inc. v. Graham, 285 So. 2d 397,402 (Fla. 1973).
302. See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 974-75.
303. See id. As described earlier, one of the employees signed the contract in his capacity as
chief of the civil engineering division, but neither of the employees were parties to the contract. See

id.
304. See Woodson v. Martin, 685 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 1996); HTP, Ltd. v. Lineas Aereas
Costarricenses, S.A., 685 So. 2d 1238, 1240 (Fla. 1996).
305. See supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
306. See supra text accompanying notes 284-85.
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analysis.""3 7 This, of course, calls into question which policy
considerations the court will equate with the products liability-type
to speculate on
analysis. The court provided
308 few answers by refusing
it.
before
not
circumstances
The answer to the policy consideration question is further confused '3by
the facts in Moransais,which seemed to involve "substantially identical
policy concerns to the products liability-type analysis applied in Florida
Power & Light. As mentioned above, the homebuyer in Moransais
negotiated a contract which allocated the economic risks by setting a
$50,000 limit on liability. 310 When the contract was not performed to the
homebuyer's satisfaction he suffered purely economic losses.3 1 According
to the products liability-type policies in FloridaPower& Light, these costs
are governed by contract law.312 Yet, the Moransaiscourt chose to "intrude
into the parties' allocation of risk by imposing a tort duty and
corresponding cost burden on the public. '31' In effect, the plaintiff
homebuyer was allowed to circumvent the remedies he bargained for by
pursuing a tort claim against the employees of the party with whom he
contracted. This avoidance of the bargained-for economic risks seems to
be exactly what the rule was designed to prevent.
4. Possible Reasons for the Court's Decision
The court's decision in Moransaisappears to be based on a desire to
limit the rule and on policy concerns. The court clearly expressed concerns
about the confusion surrounding the rule 314 and the rule's unintended
expansion." 5 Cases such as HTP were cited as examples of a recent
determination to limit the rule.31 6 In addition, the opinion focused on the
relationship between a consumer and a professional. Within this
relationship, the court questioned whether a consumer could adequately

307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Moransais,744 So. 2d at 983.
See id.
Id.
See Moransais v. Heathman, 702 So. 2d 601, 602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
See id.
See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla.

1987).
313. Id.
314. The court "acknowledge[d] that [its] pronouncements on the rule have not always been
clear and, accordingly, have been the subject of legitimate criticism and commentary." Moransais,
.744 So. 2d at 980.
315. The court admitted, "our... holdings have appeared to expand the application of the rule
beyond its principled origins and have contributed to applications of the rule by trial and appellate
courts to situations well beyond our original intent." Id.The court went on to say that it "recognized
the danger in an unprincipled extension of the rule." Id. at 981.
316. See id.
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protect himself through contract remedies.3" 7 This concern for protecting
customers in the professional services context, coupled with a desire to
limit the reach of the economic loss rule, could explain the Moransais
decision. Unfortunately, in preventing the rule from impacting the plaintiff
in Moransais,the court failed to provide a clear rule for the future. In other
words, the court may have unwittingly sacrificed much-needed clarity for
additional consumer protection and a step towards limiting the rule.
V.

COMPTECHINTERNATIONAL, INC. V. MILAM COMMERCEPARK, LTD.

Less than four months after deciding Moransais,the Florida Supreme
Court took another significant step toward restricting the reach of the
economic loss rule.31 8 In ComptechInternational,Inc. v. Milam Commerce
Park, 19 the court held that the economic loss rule is not applicable to
statutory causes of action.32 In doing so, the court quoted much of the
reasoning expressed in Moransais,including the admitted lack of clarity
created by decisions such as AFM Corp.32 In addition, the court pointed
out the awkwardness of applying the rule's concept of "other property" in
the services context.322 However, the court still refused to expressly
overrule its earlier decision, in AFM Corp., that the rule applies to services
as well as products.323
A. The Facts
In Comptech, the plaintiff, Comptech International, Inc. (Comptech),
32 4
was a party to a lease agreement with Milam Commerce Park (Milam).
The subject of the lease was warehouse space that the plaintiff used for
storing computers. 325 At some point the parties renewed the lease with the
stipulation that, as part of the renewal agreement, Milam would make
certain renovations to the warehouse.326 During the renovations,
Comptech's computers remained stored in the warehouse. 327 A contractor,
hired by Milam, was negligent in making the renovations, resulting in

317. See id. at 982.
318. See generally Comptech Int'l v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 753 So. 2d 1219 (Fla.

1999).
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id.
See id. at 1227.
See id. at 1224-26.
See id. at 1225.
See id. at 1227 (Wells, J., concurring).
See id. at 1221.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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damage to Comptech's computers. 3 2 Furthermore, Milam neglected to
acquire the necessary building permits for the renovations. 329 Therefore,
330
Comptech brought suit against Milam alleging, among other things,
negligent33construction
and a violation of section 553.84 of the Florida
1
Statutes.
B. The FloridaSupreme Court'sDecision
Comptech reached the Florida Supreme Court as a result of a conflict
between the Third and Fifth District Courts of Appeal. 332 The Third
District determined (1) that Comptech's claim for negligent construction
did not fit within the "other property" exception to the economic loss rule
and (2) that the statutory cause of action pursuant to section 553.84 was
barred by the economic loss rule.333 Subsequent to the Third District's
3
decision, the Fifth District held, in Stallings v. Kennedy Electric,Inc., 34
that the economic loss rule did not apply to a cause of action brought
pursuant to section 553.84 and sought review from the supreme court due
to the conflict with the Third District's earlier decision.335
On review, the supreme court held "that the economic loss rule does not
bar statutory causes of action," thereby rejecting the position of the Third
District and approving the decision of the Fifth.3 36 At the outset, the court
noted that the Legislature possesses the power to create laws establishing
causes of action.337 When the courts attempt to limit these laws with
"judicial policies, separation of powers issues are created, and that tension

328. See id.
329. See id.

330. Comptech also alleged that Milam was liable for "negligent selection of contractor (and]
return of illegally collected rent." Id.
331. See id. Section 553.84 provides:

Notwithstanding any other remedies available, any person or party in an individual
capacity or on behalf of a class of persons or parties, damaged as a result of a
violation of this part or the State Minimum Building Codes, has a cause of action
in any court of competent jurisdiction against the person or party who committed
the violation.
FLA. STAT. § 553.84 (1995).
332. See Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1220-21.
333. See id. at 1220 n.l.
334. 710 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
335. See Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1220 n. 1.After the Fifth District's decision in Stallings, "the
Third District issued a revised opinion attempting to explain there was no conflict between the two
cases." Id.
336. Id. at 1223.
337. See id.at 1222.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss4/3

34

Walker: Moransais v. Heathman and the Florida Economic Loss Rule: Attempt
FLORIDA ECONOMIC LOSS RULE

must be resolved in favor of the Legislature's right to act in this area. 338
The court went on to quote a recent opinion by the Fourth District stating:
When the legislature creates a statutory cause of action.., it
is presumed to know the common law of contract and tort and
the limitations on such remedies created by judges. [The
economic loss rule] is one of those judicial limitations. In
crafting new statutory causes of action, the legislature is
master of the elements and boundaries on the new cause of
action. Hence, the legislature's use of unqualified
terms---"any person" and "any loss of injury"--in the text of
such a statute evidences ... its intent not to apply judicial
limits on common law remedies to the new statutory cause of
action.339
Agreeing with the Fourth District's reasoning, as well as earlier decisions
of both the Second and Fifth Districts, the court determined that
Comptech's claim for a violation of section 553.84 was not barred by the
economic loss rule.?
Having reached a decision on the statutory cause of action issue, the
court moved on to address the issue of whether the computers were
considered "other property" under the economic loss rule.341 The court's
analysis began with an examination of the formation of the rule. 2 East
River was cited for the proposition that the rule is rooted in the products
liability field. 343 The court acknowledged that "it seems abundantly clear
that the Supreme Court [in East River] was dealing with and concerned
about a product that had malfunctioned, injuring itself but causing no
injury to persons or other property." 344 Furthermore, the court recognized
that "[h]ad the courts adhered to [the] requirements [established in East
River] (a product, the product damaging itself, and economic losses), the
confusion that has abounded in this area of law would have been
minimized."'345
Next, continuing its discussion of the other property issue, the court
reflected back on Moransais.346 As it had done in Moransais,the court

338. Id.
339. Id. at 1223 (quoting Facchina v. Mutual Benefits Corp., 735 So. 2d 499, 502 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1999)).
340. See id.
341. See id.
342. See id.
343. See id.
344. Id. at 1224.

345. Id.
346. See id. at 1224-26.
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admitted that a lack of clarity was one of the shortcomings of its earlier
decisions on the economic loss rule.347 "'Also, directly quoting Moransais,
the court again suggested that the rule was primarily intended to limit
actions in the product liability context, and its application should generally
be limited to those contexts."' ' 8
Given that the rule was intended for application in products liability
cases, the court noted the obvious difficulty in applying the concept of
"other property" to the negligence claim in Comptech, which was based on
services provided by the defendant.349 More specifically, the court stated:
This case is not a products liability or similar case. The
subject of the contract between the parties was not a product
but a service. Thus, this case does not involve "other
property," as that term was used in East River and Florida
Power.The term is not truly applicable to a situation such as
the one35before
us where the subject of the contract is a
0
service.
However, as the court reasoned, if the concept of "other property" did
apply to the facts of Comptech, the computers fit within the exception.35
Applying a Casa Clara analysis,352 the subject of the contract, a.k.a. the
"product," was the warehouse renovation.5 3 According to the court, since
Comptech's computers were not part of the renovations, they were "other
property. '3 4 Therefore, Comptech's claim355for damages to the computers
was not barred by the economic loss rule.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Wells agreed with the majority's
analysis. 356 However, Justice Wells also restated the position he took
earlier in Moransais: "that in order to clarify the application of the

347. See id. at 1225.
348. Id. at 1226 (quoting Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973,983 (Fla. 1999)). Notably,
the court omitted the language "or situations where the policy considerations are substantially
identical to those underlying the product-liability type analysis" from the original sentence as it
appeared in Moransais.Moransais,744 So. 2d at 983. The court may have omitted the language
because of the phrase's ambiguous nature. See supra text accompanying notes 307-08. In the
alternative, the omission may be an indication that the court is uncomfortable with the rule's
application outside the context of products liability claims.
349. See Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1226.
350. Id.
351. See id.
352. For the CasaClaraanalysis of"other property," see supratext accompanying notes 145-

48.
353.
354.
355.
356.

See Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1226.
See id. at 1226-27.
See id.
See id. at 1227 (Wells, J., concurring).
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economic loss rule," AFM Corp. should be overruled and the rule should
be "expressly... limited to product claims."35' 7 Justice Wells was joined
in his concurrence by Justices Pariente and Lewis. s
C. Analysis of the Comptech Decision
The Comptech decision provides further evidence that the court is now
determined to leash the monster known as the economic loss rule.
Although Comptech did not resolve the confusion left by Moransais,the
decision did establish that statutory causes of action are no longer limited
by the rule.359 In addition, the reasoning applied by the majority in
Comptech further substantiated Justice Well's argument that AFM Corp.
should be overruled.
The Comptech court's decision that statutory causes of action cannot be
prevented by the rule indicates a desire, similar to the one displayed in
Moransais, to limit the reach of the economic loss rule. However, the
holding in Comptech was apparently not based on the same reasoning as
Moransais. In fact, Moransais was not even mentioned until the court
reached the "other property" issue.3 ° Instead, the court's holding on the
statutory cause of action issue was based on separation of powers
considerations.361 More specifically, the court was concerned about a
judicially-created doctrine, the economic loss rule, interfering with
legislative intent.362
Unfortunately, Comptech did little to shed light on an important
question remaining after Moransais-whatis the current status of the
economic loss rule regarding negligence claims involving non-professional
services? Whereas Moransais suggested that the rule was not meant to
prohibit "well-established common law causes of action, 363 Comptechput
forward that the "rule cannot be used as a barrier to legitimate causes of
action whether they be statutory or common law."364 Which negligence
claims based on non-professional services will be regarded as "legitimate"
in the wake of Comptech is no clearer than whether such claims ought to
be considered "well-established" under Moransais. Of course, this

357. Id. (Wells, J., concurring).
358. See id. (Wells, J., concurring). In Moransais, only Justice Pariente joined in Justice
Wells' concurring opinion. See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 984 (Wells, J., concurring). The addition
of Justice Lewis in Comptech lends weight to the notion, discussed below, that the court may soon
overrule AFM Corp. and limit the rule's application to services.
359. See Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1227.
360. See id. at 1225.
361. See id. at 1222; supra text accompanying notes 337-40.
362. See Comptech, 573 So. 2d at 1222.
363. Moransais,744 So. 2d at 983.
364. Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1225-26.
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confusion could have been avoided, as will be discussed below, by
following Justice Well's recommendation that the rule be "limited to
product claims. 365
As mentioned above, the Comptech court referred to Moransaisin its
discussion of the "other property" issue.36 In fact, the court quoted, at
length, the portion of Moransaiswhich discussed that AFM Corp. might
have been "'over-expansive"' in extending the economic loss rule to
include services. 367 The court further acknowledged the problem with
extending the rule to services by admitting that "had the courts adhered to
[the] requirements [of] a product, the product damaging itself, and
economic losses . . . , the confusion that has abounded in this area
' In addition, the
(economic loss rule cases) would have been minimized."368
to
court conceded that the "other property" concept "is not truly applicable
' 36
service.
a
is
contract
the
of
subject
the
where
a situation..,
Despite its multiple admissions of the problems associated with
applying the rule to services, the court once again failed to put the final nail
in the AFM Corp. coffin. That failure led Justice Wells to restate his
position, originally expressed in Moransais,30 that the court should limit
the economic loss rule to products and retreat from its holding in AFM
Corp.371 If the court had adopted Justice Wells' view, there would be no
need to determine which common law causes of action are "legitimate"
37 - Instead,
under Comptech or "well-established" pursuant to Moransais.
the rule would simply and strictly apply in the context in which it
originated-products liability. In addition, by restricting the rule to product
claims, the court could have eliminated much of "the confusion that has
abounded" in cases involving the rule.373 Lastly, expressly limiting the rule
to products would have avoided future difficulties with applying the "other
374
property" principle to scenarios in which it "is not truly applicable."
Unfortunately, the court did not adopt Justice Wells' approach, thereby
passing up another opportunity to bring clarity to the rule.

365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

Id. at 1227 (Wells, J., concurring).
See id. at 1224-26.
Id. (quoting Moransais,744 So. 2d at 982)
Id. at 1224.
Id. at 1226.
See Moransais,744 So. 2d at 984 (Wells, J., concurring).
See Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1227 (Wells, J. Concurring).
See supra notes 362-64 and accompanying text.
Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1224; supra note 367 and accompanying text.
Comptech, 753 So. 2d at 1226; supra note 368 and accompanying text.
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From a legal theory perspective, the future of the tort-eating monster
known as the economic loss rule is not clear. Moransaisand Comptech
indicate that the Florida Supreme Court wants to curb the monster's
appetite. Unfortunately, the effort to do so in the Moransais opinion
provides little direction as to how the economic loss rule may be applied
or restricted in the future. Judges, lawyers, and commentators are left to
interpret the court's suggestion that the rule's "application should generally
be limited to those contexts or situations where the policy considerations
are substantially identical to those underlying the product liability-type
analysis.""37 In addition, Comptech did not clear up the confusion left by
Moransais,since it followed Moransais in the decision not to overrule
AFM Corp.
Despite the court's failure in Moransaisand Comptech to retreat from
AFM Corp., both decisions provide plaintiff's lawyers with strong
arguments in favor of limiting the economic loss rule to products liability
cases. For instance, Comptech clearly recognized the difficulty in applying
the term "other property" to negligence claims based on services. Since
both Moransaisand Comptech indicate that the Florida Supreme Court is
uncomfortable with the rule's operation in the services context, the express
decision to limit the rule to products liability claims may be just around the
comer. Therefore, there is strong indication that future lower court rulings
which apply the rule to negligence claims based on non-professional
services will be reversed if they cross the path of the supreme court. This
potential for reversal may pave an easier road for plaintiffs seeking to
assert those claims.
At the very least, Moransaisstands for the proposition that professional
malpractice claims are not barred by the economic loss rule. The court
established that position when it plainly stated that "[t]he rule.., should
not be invoked to bar well-established causes of action in tort, such as
professional malpractice. ' 37 6 In addition, Comptech clearly removed
statutory causes of action from the rule's grasp. It remains to be seen what
other "well-established causes of action" will escape the monster's hunger
for torts.

375. Moransais,744 So. 2d at 983.
376. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

39

Florida Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 4 [2000], Art. 3

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol52/iss4/3

40

